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ABSTRACT
We introduce a new permissionless blockchain architecture called
ABC. ABC is completely asynchronous, and does rely on neither
randomness nor proof-of-work. ABC can be parallelized, and trans-
actions have finalitywithin one round trip of communication. How-
ever, ABC satisfies only a relaxed formof consensus by introducing
a weaker termination property. Without full consensus, ABC can-
not support certain applications, in particular ABC cannot support
general smart contracts. However, many important applications do
not need general smart contracts, and ABC is a better solution for
these applications. In particular, ABC can implement the function-
ality of a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin, replacing Bitcoin’s energy-
hungry proof-of-work with a proof-of-stake validation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nakamoto’s Bitcoin protocol [11] has taught the world how to
achieve trust without a designated trusted party. The Bitcoin archi-
tecture provides an interesting deviation from classic distributed
systems approaches, for instance by using proof-of-work to allow
anonymous participants to join and leave the system at any point,
without permission.
However, Bitcoin’s proof-of-work solution comes at serious costs
and compromises. The security of the system is directly related
to the amount of investments in designated proof-of-work hard-
ware, and to spending energy to run that hardware. Since the sys-
tem’s participants that provide the distributed infrastructure (of-
ten called miners or validators) bear significant costs (hardware,
energy), the protocol compensates them with Bitcoins. However,
adversaries might disrupt this scheme by bribing the miners to be-
have untruthfully or disrupt the reward payments.
To make matters worse, proof-of-work protocols assume criti-
cal requirements related to the communication between the par-
ticipants regarding message loss and timing guarantees. In other
words, such protocols are vulnerable to attacks on the underlying
network.
In the decade since the original Bitcoin publication, researchers
have tried to address the wastefulness of proof-of-work. One of the
most prominent research directions is replacing Bitcoin’s proof-
of-work with a proof-of-stake approach. In proof-of-stake designs,
miners are replaced with participants who contribute to running
the system according to the amounts of cryptocurrency they hold.
Alas, proof-of-stake protocols require similar communication guar-
antees as proof-of-work, and thus can also be attacked by disrupt-
ing the network. Moreover, proof-of-stake introduces some of its
own problems. Prominently, existing proof-of-stake designs criti-
cally rely on randomness. To achieve consensus, the participants
of such systems repeatedly choose a leader among themselves. De-
spite being random, this choice needs to be taken collectively and
in a verifiable way, which complicates the problem.
Due to the way blockchains typically process transactions, par-
ticipants have to wait significant amount of time before they can
be confident that their transactions are accepted by the system. For
example, it usually takes around an hour for merchants to accept
Bitcoin transactions as confirmed, which is unacceptable for time-
sensitive applications.
In his seminal paper, Nakamoto made the crucial assumption
that his system has to be able to totally order the transactions sub-
mitted to the system in order to reject the fraudulent ones. How-
ever, meeting this requirement is equivalent to solving the prob-
lem known as consensus. Nakamoto’s assumption has shaped the
design of blockchain systems to this day. Thus, many blockchain
systems achieve consensus while not taking advantage of this pow-
erful property, but suffering the associated costs.
Our Contribution. We relax the usual notion of consensus to
extract the requirements necessary for an efficient cryptocurrency.
Thus we introduce an asynchronous blockchain design that fea-
tures an array of advantages compared to alternatives. In other
words, we present an Asynchronous Blockchain without Consen-
sus (ABC). ABC offers a host of exciting properties:
Permissionless: Most importantly, ABC offers its advantages
without relying on permissioned participation. ABC is per-
missionless in the same way as other proof-of-stake sys-
tems, where participants of the system freely exchange cryp-
tocurrency tokens. Token holders run the system by verify-
ing new transactions. Additionally, any token holder can in-
dicate any other participant to take his part in this process,
but preserving his ownership of the associated tokens.
Asynchronous: ABC does not require the messages to be de-
livered within any known period of time. Thus ABC is fully
resilient to all network-related threats, such as delayingmes-
sages, denial-of-service or network eclipse attacks. An ad-
versary having complete control of the network obviously
can delay progress of the system (by simply disabling com-
munication), but otherwise cannot interfere with the proto-
col or trick the participants in any way. Previously approved
transactions cannot be invalidated and impermissible trans-
actions cannot be approved.
Parallelizable: In ABC, validators running the system can par-
allelize the processing of transactions. There is no limit to
the number of transactions a validator can process by paral-
lelization.
Final: Under normally functioning network communication,
transactions in ABC are instantly confirmed. Confirmation
is final and impossible to revert. This is in stark contrast to
systems such as Bitcoin, where the confidence in a transac-
tion being confirmed only probabilistically increases with
the passage of time.
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Table 1: Comparison of ABC to selected BFT/blockchain protocols. Permissioned protocols are on the left, permissionless
protocols on the right. We mark all protocols providing full consensus as supporting general smart contracts, even though
particular implementations might not feature smart contracts.
PBFT[1] HoneyBadger
BFT[10]
Broadcast-
based[5]
Bitcoin and
Ethereum[14]
Ouroboros[7] Algorand[2] ABC
Permissionless X X X X
Proof-of-work
free
X X X X X X
Finality X X X X X
Asynchronous X X X
Deterministic X X X
Parallelizable X X
General smart
contracts
X X X X X
Deterministic: Weassume the functionality provided by asym-
metric encryption and hashing. Apart from these crypto-
graphic necessities, ABC is completely deterministic and sur-
prisingly simple.
Proof-of-stake: Unlike proof-of-work, the security of the sys-
tem does not depend on the amount of devoted resources
such as energy, computational power, memory, etc. Instead,
similarly to other proof-of-stake protocols, ABC requires
that more than two thirds of the system’s cryptocurrency
is held by honest participants.
However, ABC does not support consensus. This prevents ABC
from supporting applications that involve smart contracts open for
interaction with anybody. For example, the smart contract func-
tionality of Ethereum cannot be directly implemented with ABC.
Many important applications (e.g., cryptocurrencies or IoT systems),
do not require consensus, and ABC offers an advantageous solu-
tion for these applications.
Table 1 compares the properties of ABC with some of the most
relevant existing BFT/blockchain paradigms. Manymore protocols
exist that improve some aspects, for example many protocols im-
prove upon PBFT.While many of these protocols are more scalable
and efficient than the original PBFT, they share the fundamental
disadvantages of PBFT: They are not permissionless, they are not
parallelizable, and in order tomake progress (“liveness”), they need
synchronous communication.
Table 1 shows the close relation of ABC with broadcast-based
protocols. One may argue that ABC brings the simplicity, robust-
ness and efficiency of broadcast-based protocols to the permission-
less world.
2 RELAXING CONSENSUS
A cryptocurrency needs to be resilient to some of the participants
of the system (called agents) behaving maliciously. The problem
of establishing consensus in such an environment is also known
as Byzantine agreement. The agents behaving truthfully are called
honest, and malicious agents are called Byzantine.
In the context of a cryptocurrency, some form of consensus is
used to solve the problem of double-spending: SupposeAlice holds
one cryptocurrency coin. NowAlice sets up a transaction that trans-
fers her coin to Bob (in exchange for a good or service). However,
Alice wants to cheat, trying to simultaneously spend the same coin
in another transaction to Carol. Upon receiving one (or both) of Al-
ice’s transactions, honest agents need to agree on what happens to
Alice’s coin, preventing Alice from doubling hermoney. In this con-
text, according to the usual definition, achieving consensus con-
sists of the following requirements:
Definition (Consensus).
Agreement: If some honest agent accepts a transaction, every
honest agent will accept the same transaction. No two conflict-
ing transactions are accepted.
Validity: If every honest agent observes the same transaction
(there are no conflicting transactions), this transaction is ac-
cepted by honest agents.
Termination: Every honest agent accepts one of the transac-
tions. If messages are delivered quickly, the consensus protocol
terminates quickly.
The key insight leading to the relaxation of this definition, is
that cheaters do not need to enjoy any guarantees. Alice from
above tried to cheat by issuing (cryptographically signing) two con-
flicting transactions. ABC will not need to guarantee that any of
Alices’s two conflicting transactions will be accepted. In fact, if she
tries to cheat, Alice might lose her coin.
On the other hand, an honest Alice will only create one transac-
tion spending her coin. Thus, every honest agent will see the same
transaction. Hence we can relax consensus to guarantee termina-
tion only for honest agents:
Definition (ABC Consensus).
Agreement: Same as above.
Validity: Same as above.
Honest-Termination If every honest agent observes the same
transaction (and no conflicting transactions), this transaction
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is accepted by all honest agents. If messages are delivered quickly,
the consensus protocol terminates quickly.
Under this relaxed notion of consensus, if Alice tries to cheat,
it is possible that neither Bob nor Carol will accept Alice’s trans-
action. Some honest agents might see one of the transactions first,
while others might see the other first. Then the requirement of
Honest-Termination does not apply, and the transactions might
stay without a resolution forever. This turn of events can be seen
as Alice losing her coin due to misbehaviour.
Otherwise Consensus and ABC Consensus do not differ. Agreed
upon results are final, conflicting results are precluded and honest
transactions are accepted quickly.
Surprisingly, despite the difference being so insignificant with
respect to the functioning of a cryptocurrency, this relaxation al-
lows ABC to combine a large set of advantages.
3 INTUITION
For simplicity of presentation, we describe ABC in the terminology
of a cryptocurrency. We refer to the cryptocurrency managed by
the protocol as the money. A more formal description follows in
Section 5.
Transactions. As usual in cryptocurrencies, the main opera-
tion is a transaction, which transfers money from one or more in-
puts to one ormore outputs. Inputs and outputs aremoney amounts
paired with keys required to spend them. Every transaction refers
to at least one previous transaction, such that all transactions form
a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
Validators. In proof-of-stake systems, the agents that own some
of the money in the system also run the system. These agents
are staying online and participating in validating transactions. In
ABC’s design, we do not require agents to stay online and par-
ticipate, but allow agents to delegate this responsibility to other
agents. All agents that stay online and validate transactions are
called validators. Every agent can choose to be a validator. If an
agent does not want to be validator, the agent can indicate (with
an additional public key in a transaction) who should be the val-
idator to whom the stake is delegated. Validators stay online and
sign correct transactions. A transaction is correct if the validator
did not see another transaction spending the same input(s). The
system works correctly as long as agents holding more than two-
thirds of the system’s money indicate honest validators.
Confirmations. A transaction t is confirmed by the system if
enough validators ack (acknowledge by signing) t . An ack cannot
be revoked. If a transaction receives enough acks, no other trans-
action conflicting with t can become confirmed. In particular, if a
cheating Alice attempts to issue a transaction t ′ which is trying
to spend (some of) the same input(s) as t , the system will never
confirm t ′. If Alice issues two conflicting transactions t and t ′ at
roughly the same time, it is possible that (a) either t or t ′ gets con-
firmed (but not both), or (b) neither t nor t ′ are ever confirmed.
Case (b) happens if some (but not enough) validators see and sign
t , while others see and sign t ′. The system might stay in this state
forever with the validators’ approval split between t and t ′, with
no clear majority. Such a situation can only arise if Alice tried to
cheat. The result is equivalent to the misbehaving agent losing the
money she attempted to double-spend, and does not constitute any
threat to the system.
It is somewhat intuitive to verify that such a system does work
correctly if the validating power amounts are statically assigned to
the validators, and a set of validators controlling more than two-
thirds of the cryptocurrency obeys the protocol. In Section 6 we
will show that our system still works correctly when the agents
can freely exchange the cryptocurrency and change the appointed
validators, even in the harsh conditions of an asynchronous net-
work. Thus, we establish a system with the participation model
similar to proof-of-stake protocols, but much simpler than known
proof-of-stake protocols.
4 MODEL
Agents andAdversary. Our blockchain is used andmaintained
by its participants called agents. Agents who follow the protocol
are called honest. The set of agents who do not follow the protocol
is controlled by the adversary. The adversary behaves in an arbi-
trary (Byzantine) way.
Similarly to other proof-of-stake systems, we assume that at any
time, the adversary owns less than one-third of the cryptocurrency
present in the system.We introducemore concepts in order to state
this requirement precisely in Section 5.4.
AsynchronousCommunication. All agents are connected by
a virtual network similar to Bitcoin’s, where agents can broadcast
their messages to all other agents. Like in Bitcoin, new agents can
join this network to receive new and prior messages. Agents can
also leave the network.
The network is asynchronous: The adversary controls the net-
work, dictating when messages are delivered and in what order.
Messages are only required to reach the recipient eventually, with-
out any bound on the time it might take. Under suchweak network
requirements, an adversary delaying the delivery of messages can
delay the progress of an agent, but otherwise will not be able to
interfere with the protocol or trick honest agents.
In the Appendix, we summarize why many of the protocols in
Table 1 cannot be considered asynchronous.
Cryptographic Primitives. We assume the functionality of
asymmetric encryption where a public key allows every agent to
verify a signature of the associated secret key. Agents can freely
generate public/secret key pairs.
We also assume cryptographic hashing, where for every mes-
sage a succinct, unique hash can be computed. Whenever we men-
tion references between transactions in our protocol,wemean hashes
that uniquely identify the referenced data.
Apart from these two primitives, theABC protocol is completely
deterministic.
5 PROTOCOL
5.1 Transactions
Outputs. Outputs are the basic unit of information. Outputs
are included in transactions to identify money holders and corre-
sponding money amounts.
Definition 1 (Output). An output contains:
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→ (p1, 4)
→ (p2, 5)
→ (p3, 3)
Genesis
(p1, 4) → (p4, 2)
→ (p5, 2)
sign(s1 )
(p2, 5) → (p6, 5)
sign(s2 )
(p4, 2) → (p7, 1)
(p6, 5) → (p8, 2)
→ (p9, 4)
sign(s4 , s6)
Figure 1: Example DAG of transactions, validator keys are
omitted. Thepi ’s are owner keys, and si ’s are the correspond-
ing secret keys.
• Value: A number representing the amount of money.
• Owner key: A public key. The agent holding the associated
secret key is the owner of the money.
In general, agents could reuse their keys for multiple outputs,
but for simplicity of presentation we assume that the owner key
always uniquely identifies a single output.
Transactions. A transaction is a request issued by an agent (or
a set of agents) to transfer money to other agent(s). Outputs of a
transaction identify recipients of the transaction. The transaction
also indicates a validator – some agent devoted to maintaining the
system.
For simplicity of presentation we assume that outputs uniquely
identify the originating transaction.
Definition 2 (Transaction). A transaction t contains:
• A set of inputs, where each input is an output of some previous
transaction. Transaction t is said to spend these inputs.
• A set of outputs. The sum of values of the outputs equals the
sum of values of the inputs.
• Validator key: A public key. The agent holding the associated
secret key is indicated as the validator.
The sum of values of the outputs is called the value of t . The trans-
action is signed by all secret keys associated with the inputs.
Genesis. The genesis is a special transactionwithout inputs (and
hence without the associated signatures). The genesis is hard-coded
in the protocol and known upfront to every agent. The genesis de-
scribes the initial distribution of money among the original agents
and the initial validators (which could be the same as the original
agents).
The values of all genesis outputs sum up toM , soM is the total
money in the system.
5.2 Validators
Intuitively, validators are agents devoted to maintaining the sys-
tem. Validators listen for transactions being broadcast, and sign
them if they are notmisbehaving. After a transaction t with a value
ofm is processed by the system, the “signing power” of the valida-
tor v indicated in transaction t increases bym (at the cost of the
validators indicated in transactions that output the inputs of t ). To
spend an output of t , the owner of an outputmust later broadcast a
new transaction, asv does not control how the outputs of t will be
spent. An owner of an output of t can change the appointed valida-
torv to any other validator by spending t ’s output (for instance by
self-sending the money), including a different validator key. Any
agent can also indicate herself as the validator.
The validator v signs transactions in the system to contribute
to their confirmation, and the contribution is proportional to the
amount of money delegated to v .
Efficiency. In ABC, we expect the number of validators to be
naturally relatively small, such that a small number of validator’s
signatures will be enough to confirm a transaction. We think of a
validator in ABC to be the equivalent of mining pools in Bitcoin.
The set of validators in ABC will shift and change over time, simi-
larly to Bitcoin mining pools.
Without mitigation, an excessive number of (relatively power-
less) validators would require excessive numbers of signatures to
be broadcast in the network. If one worries about the number of
validators being too large, validators can be incentivized (or re-
quired) to form groups by the protocol. For example, the proto-
col might state that too small validators receive smaller fees from
transaction confirmation.We will discuss this in more detail in Sec-
tion 7.3.
5.3 Confirmations
A validator broadcasts a message called an ack to communicate the
new set of transactions it signed.
Definition 3 (ack). An ack contains:
• A reference to the previous ack issued by the same validator.
• A set of references to transactions t the validator signs.
The ack is signed by the validator’s secret key.
All messages can only reference previously created messages
with hashes. Cyclic hash references are impossible and hence all
messages form a directed acyclic graph (DAG), with the genesis
being the only root. Messages are processed in any order respect-
ing references. Agents do not process a transaction t until past(t)
is received in full.
Definition 4 (past). The set of messages reachable by following ref-
erences from t is called past(t). For a set of messages T , past(T ) =
⋃
t ∈T past(t).
Transactions can be confirmed by the system, and confirmation
is permanent. A transaction t becomes confirmed when enough
validators broadcast an ack signing it. After a transaction is con-
firmed, the stake delegated to the validator indicated in t increases
by the value of t (and appropriately decreases for the validators to
whom the inputs were delegated). Thus we define transaction con-
firmation and the stake delegated to a validator inductively (from
genesis) with respect to each other.
Genesis is confirmed from the start.
Definition 5 (delegated stake). Given a set of acks A, let TC be
the set of transactions confirmed in past(A) that indicate v as the
validator. The stake delegated to v in past(A) is equal to the sum of
values of outputs of transactions in TC that are unspent in past(A).
Definition 6 (confirmed). A transaction t is confirmed if the trans-
actions that output the inputs of t are confirmed, and there exists a
set of acks At such that:
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→ (p1, 4),v1
→ (p2, 4),v2
→ (p3, 2),v3
Genesis
(p1, 4) → (p4, 3)
→ (p5, 1)
v4
(p4, 3) → (p7, 3)
v5
(p3, 2) → (p6, 2)
v2
(p1, 4) → (p9, 4)
v9
(p6, 2) → (p8, 5)
(p7, 3) →
v8
v1
v2 v4
v2
v3
Figure 2: Example transaction DAG, pi ’s represent the owners and vi ’s the validators. Circle nodes are acks labelled by the
issuing validators. Acks point to the transactions being signed or the previous acks of the same validator. Blue transactions
are confirmed based on the acks. When issuing an ack, validators have to point to the previously issued ack, as exhibited byv2.
The gray transaction is an attempt at double-spending; it conflicts with a confirmed transaction and will never be confirmed.
• some validatorsv1, . . . ,vk with respective delegated stakem1, . . . ,mk
in past(At ) sign t , and
∑k
i=1mi >
2
3M ;
• no transaction t ′ ∈ past(At ) shares an input with t .
Honest agents do not spend their inputs more than once. Given
some honest transaction t , all validators can sign t and for no po-
tential At will there be a t
′ ∈ past(At ) that shares an input with t .
Then it is straightforward to collect validator acks for t and show
that t is confirmed.
On the other hand, if some t ′ sharing inputs with t is present
in the transaction DAG, it might be unclear if there is a set At
exhibiting that t is confirmed. It is only the misbehaving agent’s
concern to find an appropriate At and prove to the recipient of t
that t is confirmed.
5.4 Adversary
The adversary behaves in an arbitrary way, and thus might cre-
ate conflicting transactions, acks that do not reference previously
issued acks, send different messages to different recipients, etc.
Any message sent by an honest agent is immediately seen by
the adversary. The delivery of each message from an honest agent
to an honest agent can be delayed by the adversary for an arbitrary
amount of time.
Stake. We make a standard assumption pertaining to proof-of-
stake systems that the adversary does never control more than one-
third of the stake. The assumption is the equivalent of assuming
that the adversary does not control more than one-third of the per-
missions in a BFT protocol, or half of the hashing power in a proof-
of-work system such as Bitcoin. An agent owning a large stake in
a system is heavily invested in the system. While this agent at-
tacking his own system is certainly feasible with deep pockets, it
→ (p1, 4),v1
→ (p2, 4),v2
→ (p3, 2),v3
Genesis
(p1, 4) → (p4, 3)
→ (p5, 1)
v4
(p4, 3) → (p7, 3)
v5
(p3, 2) → (p6, 2)
v2
v1
v2 v4
t1
t2
Figure 3: A subview of the transaction DAG from Figure 2.
The set At1 consisting of the acks of validatorsv1 andv2 is a
proof that t1 is confirmed. The set At2 consisting of the acks
of validators v1, v2 and v4 is a proof that t2 is confirmed.
is also self-destructive. So far, larger cryptocurrencies such as Bit-
coin have not seen such self-attacks.
More formally, the value of genesis outputs delegated to the ad-
versary sums up to less thanM/3. In every transaction, a new val-
idator is indicated, and the stake delegated to the adversary might
shift over time.
Definition 7 (adversary stake). Letmt be the value of a transac-
tion t , andmt,A be the sum of values of inputs of t that are outputs of
transactions delegated to the adversary. Consequentlym −mA is the
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→ (p1, 3),v1
→ (p2, 2),v2
→ (p3, 2),v3
→ (p4, 2),v4
Genesis
(p2, 2) → (p5, 2)
v2
(p4, 2) → (p7, 2)
v5
(p4, 2) → (p6, 2)
v5
v1
v2 v3
v4
v4
Figure 4: Example attempt at double-spending. The valida-
torv4 is adversarial, does not reference previous acks in new
acks and attempts to confirm conflicting transactions. Hon-
est validators are split between conflicting transactions such
that neither will ever be confirmed.
sum of values of inputs of t that are outputs of transactions delegated
to honest agents.
If a transaction t is delegated to an honest agent, then we subtract
mt,A from the amount we count as delegated to the adversary when
t is confirmed (i.e. when some At exists).
If transaction t is delegates to the adversary, then we add mt −
mt,A to the amount we count as delegated to the adversary when t is
issued.
In Section 6we show that with these assumptions, no conflicting
transactions will be confirmed.
6 CORRECTNESS
This section is devoted to proving that the presented protocol up-
holds ABC Consensus as defined in Section 2.
Under our assumption from Section 5.4, more than two-thirds of
the money is always delegated to honest validators. Hence, if there
is no double-spend alternative to a transaction t , honest validators
will sign t and t will be confirmed by the system. Thus Validity
and Honest-Termination of Definition 2 hold.Whenever any agent
observes a transaction t as confirmed, the acks At serve as the
proof that t is confirmed to any other agent. Therefore, to show
that Agreement holds, it suffices to show that no pair of conflicting
transactions is ever confirmed.
Corollary 1. If no conflicting transactions are confirmed, ABC pro-
tocol satisfies ABC consensus.
We now focus on proving that if our assumptions are met, it
is impossible that any two conflicting transactions are confirmed,
also known as the problem of double-spending.
Every transaction t depends on transactions that happened be-
fore t in order for t to be possible.
Definition 8 (Depends). If a transaction t ′ spends one or more out-
puts of transaction t , then t ′ depends on t . Dependence is transitive
and reflexive, i.e. every transaction depends on itself and if t2 depends
on t1 and t3 depends on t2, then t3 depends on t1.
Any two transactions that together would produce an inconsis-
tent state of the system, such as double-spend transactions, are said
to conflict.
Definition 9 (Conflicts). If two transactions t1 and t2 spend the
same output, they conflict. Moreover, for two conflicting transactions
t1, t2, every transaction that depends on t1 conflicts with every trans-
action that depends on t2.
Proof Outline. For contradiction, assume that some transac-
tion DAG can be produced by the protocol where two conflicting
transactions tx and ty are confirmed. Consider the instance of such
a DAG G that is minimal in terms of the number of transactions.
Although ABC is completely asynchronous, we consider some
ordering ofmessages that represents “time”. Everymessage in ABC
is ordered such that events in the DAG respect the time, i.e., if an
event t ′ points to an event t in the DAG, the time of t must be
smaller than the time of t ′.
Consider the first transaction t0 that becomes confirmed in DAG
G during the protocol’s execution. In Lemma 4 we show that for
any other confirmed transaction t , either t0 ∈ past(At ) or t ∈
past(At0 ) holds in DAG G (illustrated in Figure 5). We conclude in
Corollary 5 that t0 cannot conflict with any transaction. In Lemma
6 we note that t0 does not serve a purpose for the construction of
DAGG, as t0’s inputs could be replaced in genesis with t0’s outputs
for a smaller DAG. This contradicts with out choice ofG, and The-
orem 7 summarizes that under our assumptions, conflicting trans-
actions cannot be confirmed in a single DAG.
Lemma 2. If a confirmed transaction t2 depends on t1, t1 is con-
firmed.
Proof. Follows directly from Definitions 6 and 8 by induction.

Lemma 3. There are no unconfirmed transactions inG.
Proof. Suppose some unconfirmed transaction tu exists in G.
Since tu is unconfirmed, by Lemma 2 no confirmed transaction
depends on tu .
Let A be some set of acks in DAG G. Consider the DAG G ′ ob-
tained by removing tu together with transactions that depend on
tu , and removing references from acks to tu (and dependent trans-
actions). Let A′ be the set of acks in G ′ corresponding to A. By
Definition 5, for any validator v , the stake delegated to v in A′ is
no less than in A. Hence, by Definition 6, any transaction t con-
firmed in G remains confirmed in G ′. In particular, tx and ty are
confirmed in G ′. However, G ′ contains less transactions thanG, a
contradiction withG being minimal. 
Weargue about the confirmed transactionswith respect to some
total order ofmessages in “time” that respectsmessage dependence.
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Of course, between different executions producing the same trans-
action DAG, some transactions might be confirmed in different or-
ders (or at the same time); we fix one arbitrary possible order of
messages <time and choose t0 as the first transaction confirmed
in G during the execution, i.e. such that there is a set At0 where
max<t ime At0 is minimal.
Lemma 4. Let t be some confirmed transaction. Then, either t0 ∈
past(At ) or t ∈ past(At0 ) holds inG.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction for some t neither t0 ∈ past(At )
nor t ∈ past(At0 ) hold in G. Since t0 is the first transaction con-
firmed during the execution of the protocol, by Definitions 5 and
6, the first possible At0 contains only acks of validators specified
in genesis. The value of genesis outputs delegated to the adversary
can only amount to less than M/3, so At0 has to contain honest
acks Ah,t0 ⊆ At0 of value larger thanM/3 (where the genesis out-
puts associated withAh,t0 are not spent in past(At0 ), by Definition
5). Let Vh be the (honest) validators that issued acks in Ah,t0 . Hon-
est validators reference subsequent acks, so since t < past(At0 ),Vh
have not signed t before signing t0.
We observe:
• none of acks in Ah,t0 are in past(At );
• Vh have not signed t before signing t0;
• the genesis outputs delegated toVh are not spent in past(Ah,t0 );
• more than 1/3M is delegated toVh in genesis.
Hence, in past(At ), any transaction spending the outputs delegated
in genesis to Vh can be signed by validators with less than 2/3M
stake delegated, and similarly, t can only be signed by validators
with less than 2/3M stake delegated in At , a contradiction. 
Corollary 5. There is no transaction conflicting with t0 inG.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 3 and 4. 
Lemma 6. There is a DAG G ′ where in genesis the inputs of t0 are
replaced with the outputs of t0, and the set of confirmed transactions
is the same as inG, except not including t0.
Proof. Let V be the set of validators to whom the inputs of
t0 are delegated in genesis, and v be the validator to whom t0 is
delegated. Consider some confirmed transaction t1. By Lemma 4
either t1 ∈ past(At0 ) or t0 ∈ past(At1 ). Since t0 is spending the
outputs delegated to v , v can only have signed t1 if t0 < past(At1 ).
Then t1 ∈ past(At0 ). Hence, for any At1 where v contributes an
ack, we have t1 ∈ past(At0 ). If the set V contributed an ack to At1
and v contributed an ack to At2 , t1 and t2 cannot conflict.
Thus, in G ′ where t0’s inputs are replaced with t0’s outputs in
genesis the validators of the outputs can issue acks equivalent to
those inG. If inputs and outputs of t do not match in value, genesis
can contain smaller outputs that can combine to inputs or outputs
of t0 in value. 
Theorem7. No DAG can be produced by the ABC protocol such that
a pair of confirmed transactions are conflicting.
Proof. Suppose t0 is the first transaction confirmed inG during
the execution of the protocol. By Corollary 5, no transaction in G
conflicts with t0. By Lemma 6, there is a DAGG
′ containing fewer
Genesis
. . .
t
v1
v2
t ′
v ′1
v ′2
Figure 5: Example illustration of t ∈ past(At ′ ). Nodes vi are
acks in At and v
′
i are acks in At ′ . If t and t
′ are confirmed,
then t ∈ past(At ′ ) or t
′ ∈ past(At ). Then, t and t
′ cannot con-
flict.
transactions than G with some pair tx , ty of conflicting transac-
tions confirmed, a contradiction with minimality ofG. 
Corollary 8. ABC protocol satisfies ABC Consensus.
7 EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY
In this section, we present some practical thoughts that will help
ABC succeed.
7.1 Parallelization
In some limited scenarios, scaling the throughput by parallel pro-
cessing is impossible in any system. For example, if all transactions
pass the same token in a single chain of dependent transactions,
the transactions have to be confirmed in sequence. In ABC, valid-
ity of confirmations depends on the set of validators, so similarly, if
the set of validators changes dramatically and rapidly all the time,
these changes have to be processed sequentially. However, if we
rule out these corner cases, validators can parallelize signing and
processing of transactions in ABC. Thus, if we increase the num-
ber of machines (with constant bandwidth each) at the validator’s
disposal, the throughput of ABC increases without limit.
Parallel signing of transactions. A validator v can split the
space of possible input public keys between multiple servers, for
example based on the first few characters of the public key. These
servers can then individually check that the inputs of a transaction
have not been spent already. The transaction needs to be routed
only to a small subset ofv’s machines, which remember and deter-
mine whether the validator has signed any transactions spending
the same inputs before. Some number of transactions determined
to be safe to sign can be combined by the machines in parallel in a
Merkle tree root to be included in the next ack in logarithmic time.
Determining transaction confirmation in parallel. Again,
the transaction space can be split between machines that listen
to transactions being broadcast in the network. Based on issued
and confirmed transactions, each machine can compute the lower
and upper bound of how much the stake delegated to each val-
idator changes associated with the assigned transaction space. If
transactions t are signed by more validators than the bare oper-
ational minimum, the transaction can easily be determined to be
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confirmed without computing the exact At , past(At ), or the exact
delegated stakes associated with validator signatures.
This method is effective in realistic scenarios where more val-
idators than the bare minimum are honest and the transactions do
not shift the delegated stake faster than transaction confirmation
can be computed.
In some borderline scenarios, computing At and past(At ) ex-
actly might be unavoidable. For example, suppose the adversary
acquires and delegates to itself very close to one-third of the stake,
and subsequently refrains from participating in transaction sign-
ing. Then all honest validators must sign all transactions, and each
transaction might shift the delegated stake such that different com-
binations of validator signatures confirm a transaction.
7.2 Pruning the Transaction DAG
Blockchain systems typically append new transactions to some
data structure consisting of previous transactions. In this way, the
shared ledger grows over time and requires newly joined partici-
pants to process all transactions that took place to date. It is often
impossible for the system to completely remove past, intermediate
transactions from the data structure and relieve the participants
from processing or storing them. Additional protocols might be
devised to refer to transactions concisely, such as [6] for proof-of-
work blockchains.
We give the outline of how to permanently prune some interme-
diate transactions from the DAG in ABC. After some time passes
and the transaction DAG contains redundant information, a spe-
cial message called a checkpoint might be created (by any agent)
that references a set of acks and transactions T and summarizes
the state of the system in past(T ) by listing all confirmed unspent
transaction outputs (for example arranged in a Merkle tree) and
the distribution of stake among validators in past(T ). Then, some
validators that accounted for more than two-thirds of the stake
at some point in past(P) confirm the checkpoint much like they
would confirm a normal transaction appended to past(P).
When the validators listed in the checkpoint issue the next ack
after observing the checkpoint, they reference the checkpoint and
indicate the summary of transactions outside of past(T ) they have
signed up to this point.
Any agents newly joining the system only needs to process past(P)
and the checkpoint with subsequent acks, avoiding processing any
spent outputs that took place in past(T ) \ past(P).
For example, a set of validators accounting for more than two-
thirds of the stake in the genesis might sign a checkpoint after
some time, effectively making the checkpoint a new genesis. An
example is illustrated in Figure 6 in the appendix.
This checkpointing process relies on similar principles as nor-
mal transaction confirmation and does not solve consensus. The
validators confirm that the checkpoint succinctly summarizes past(T ),
but transactions included in the checkpoint might already be spent
when the checkpoint is created (which would be revealed by exam-
ination of subsequent acks).
7.3 Transaction Fees
To incentivize maintaining of the system by the validators and
prevent spamming attacks, transaction fees should be introduced.
ABC is not fundamentally associated with any fee structure in par-
ticular andmany alternative fee structures are possible.We present
an example fee structure. As acks only serve to confirm transac-
tions, they pay no fee.
Since ABC does not establish consensus, we will refrain from at-
tempting to choose an agreed upon subset of validators that should
receive the fee from a particular transaction. Instead, we suggest
that all validators are eligible to a portion of every transaction fee.
For example, ifm money (of the total ofM) is delegated to a valida-
tor v , v is granted a fee share mM fee(t), where fee(t) is the transac-
tion fee paid by the issuer of transaction t . The fee amount might
depend on the size of the representation of t . Unlike Bitcoin, the fee
cannot easily be determined by a market mechanism, as we need
more than two-thirds of the validator power to sign transaction t .
Agents can freely decide whom to choose as a validator. Valida-
tors v might have an incentive to reimburse the agents that have
delegated their stake to v , or the protocol itself might automati-
cally share the transaction fees of v with the money holders. In
this way, the transaction fees can flow back to the participants of
the “proof-of-stake pool”. Similarly to mining pools, validators will
try to lure as many possible agents into their pool by offering the
best conditions.
In Section 5.2 we argued that validators may be financially pun-
ished if they are too small. This punishment can be incorporated in
the fees, e.g., by simply computing the fee to be 0 if the delegated
stake of a validator is out of bounds. In case of too small validators,
this directly solves the problem.
On the other hand, it is impossible to prevent or mitigate a val-
idator being too large (too much delegated stake), as the validator
can split into two validators to stay below the stake threshold. In
other words, a large validator can hide behind multiple identities.
Note that such a problem is by no means exclusive to ABC. All
other blockchain protocols have this issue, e.g. in Bitcoin a mining
pool may simply split if it was seen as “too big”.
7.4 Money Creation
If the fees are collected according to the previous section, the fees
paid by transaction issuers equal the fees collected by those con-
firming them. If some transactions are never ack’ed by some indi-
vidual validators, money will be destroyed, and the total amount of
money M may shrink over an extended period of time. However,
for economic reasons, we rather might want that the amount of
money increases over time. If we introduce 2% new money each
year (as an inflation target), agents will be disincentivized from
hoarding their money, but actually use the system. For example,
the collected transaction fee might be multiplied by some constant
α > 1: The issuer is paying fee(t), but a validator with a delegated
stack ofm will collect α mM fee(t). Assuming every agent possesses
less than one-third of the overall stake at any point, issuing trans-
actions still incurs a cost as long as α ≤ 3.
As an additional role in Bitcoin and related systems, proof-of-
work serves to distribute newly created money in an unbiased way.
ABC could employ proof-of-work for this purpose as well. For this
purpose, transactions could be allowed to include proof-of-work
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and receive an extra amount of stake to spend as an output. How-
ever, for these rewards to vary over time, we would need to intro-
duce some mechanism for the protocol to record the passage of
time, and we leave that to future work.
7.5 Smart Contracts
Open smart contracts are not easily possible with ABC. Even an ac-
count (output) that two partners Alice1 and Alice2 can spend may
cause trouble. If Alice1 and Alice2 concurrently try to buy some
goods using two transactions t1 and t2 respectively, they might
end up the situation described in Section 2. While the input may
have enough value to pay for both goods, issuing both transactions
simultaneouslymay be seen as two conflicting transactions, and as
such as a double-spend.
So the two Alices need to be sure that they are not using the
same input at the same time. For example, the two Alices can ini-
tially set up a transaction that sends themoney in the joint account
to two new accounts that they control each. Then each Alice can
spend the money from her account.
The issue becomesmore intriguing with completely open smart
contracts that can be called by anybody in the network (for in-
stance, implementing a gambling service). In this case, ABC would
need to be augmented with another mechanism on top, ordering
transactions for the same smart contract to make sure that concur-
rent transactions (“double-spends”) for that smart contract do not
happen. Are we back to having to implement a full consensus as
in Definition 2? Yes and no. Clearly such a service needs to totally
order all incoming transactions, in other words, deciding which
transaction should be presented to ABC first.
However, this ordering overhead is only necessary for completely
open smart contracts, and smart contracts can have separate order-
ing services. Traditional BFT/blockchain protocols totally order all
transactions. This is the root of all problems, as it introduces an in-
herent bottleneck in the design of a system.
8 RELATED WORK
Permissioned systems. Even though ABC is a permissionless
system, it makes sense to compare it to some permissioned systems
as well.
Traditionally, distributed ledgers [1, 8] operate with a carefully
selected committee of trusted machines. Such systems are called
permissioned. The committee repeatedly decides which transac-
tions to accept, using some formof consensus: The committee agrees
on a transaction, votes on and commits that transaction, and only
then moves forward to agree on the next transaction.
In a work related to ours, Gupta [5] proposes a permissioned
transaction system that does not rely on consensus. In this design,
a static set of validators is designated to confirm transactions. Our
concepts of Section 7 (parallization, fees, etc.) do work in the per-
missioned setting as well, and could be applied to this work.
The authors of [4] show that the consensus number of a Bitcoin-
like cryptocurrency is 1, or in other words, that consensus is not
needed. The paper provides an analysis and discussion of which
applications rely on consensus and to what extent, all of which
is directly relevant to ABC. The authors also argue that parallels
can be drawn between a permissioned transaction system and the
problem of reliable broadcast [9].
HoneyBadger BFT [10] provides an asynchronous permissioned
system by relying on advanced cryptographic techniques with full
consensus. Again, the main differences from ABC are that the sys-
tem is permissioned, much more involved, and reliant on random-
ization.
The authors of [3] introduce a protocol based on reliable broad-
cast that allows participants to join and leave the system. In con-
trast to ABC, the protocol consists of multiple rounds of commu-
nication to agree on nodes joining or leaving the system and does
not feature a functionality to delegate one’s role in maintaining
the system. Node communication volume increases with the num-
ber of participants, therefore it cannot be applied in permissionless
contexts.
Permissionless systems. Bitcoin [11] radically departed from
the establishedmodel and became the first permissionless blockchain.
In the Bitcoin system, there is no fixed committee; instead, every-
body can participate. Bitcoin achieves this by using proof-of-work.
Proof-of-work is a randomized process tying computational power
and spent energy to the system’s security, while also requiring syn-
chronous communication. However, Bitcoin’s form of consensus
hardly satisfies the traditional consensus definition. Instead of ter-
minating at any point, the extent towhich the consensus is ensured
raises over time, approaching but never reaching certainty. More
precisely, in Bitcoin transactions are never finalized, and can be
reverted with ever decreasing probability.
Similarly to Bitcoin, ABC allows permissionless participation.
In contrast to Bitcoin, ABC does not rely on proof-of-work or ran-
domization, features parallelizability and finality, and works under
full asynchrony.
To address the problems associated with proof-of-work, proof-
of-stake has been suggested, first in a discussion on an online fo-
rum [12]. Proof-of-stake blockchains are managed by participants
holding a divisible and transferable digital resource, as opposed to
holding hardware and spending energy. Academic works propos-
ing proof-of-stake systems include designs such as Ouroboros [7]
or Algorand [2]. Proof-of-stake blockchains solve consensus and
thus do not parallelize without compromises. The reliance on syn-
chronous communication and randomization in proof-of-stake are
potential security risks. Despite avoiding these pitfalls, ABC is also
simpler.
DAG blockchains. To increase the relatively modest through-
put of Bitcoin, someproof-of-work protocols employ directed acyclic
graphs in the place of Bitcoin’s single chain. SPECTRE [13] is likely
the closest relative of ABC among such protocols, as it relaxes con-
sensus similarly to ABC. However, the similarities are largely su-
perficial, as SPECTRE remains a proof-of-work protocol, employs
different techniques, and does not share the other of ABC’s advan-
tages. SPECTRE improves many aspects of Bitcoin, but with re-
spect to the harsh criteria of Table 1, SPECTRE can only earn a
tick at permissionless.
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9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented ABC, an asynchronous blockchain with-
out consensus. ABC provides the functionality of Bitcoin without
consensus, without proof-of-work,without requiring synchronous
communication, without relying on randomness. ABC is scalable
and with finality. The design of ABC is arguably the simplest pos-
sible design for a variety of blockchain applications.
ABC provides an advantageous solution for applications like
cryptocurrencies, where honest participants do not generate con-
flicting status updates. However, a general smart contracts plat-
form like Ethereum requires full consensus. Implementing open
smart contracts is not impossible with ABC, but it would need an-
other layer of indirection as sketched in Section 7.5. Adding this
extra layer would check the last box in Table 1.
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APPENDIX
Asynchrony. In Table 1, we call many protocols not asynchro-
nous. In this section, we quickly want to justify this classification.
For many blockchain protocols such as Bitcoin, the underly-
ing network being asynchronous would be devastating. The adver-
sary could simply split the network in two, half of the agents on
one side, and half of the agents on the other side. Then the adver-
sary can double-spend all its money on both sides. Since the two
sides cannot communicate due to temporarily not receiving any
messages from the other side, both sides will eventually have the
double-spending transaction in their branch of the blockchain. The
blocks containing the transactions will eventually be confirmed by
enough (e.g., six) blocks, and the transactions are considered final
by merchants. By controlling communication, the adversary can
double-spend its money.
One may think that BFT protocol such as PBFT [1] can handle
asynchrony better. To some extent this is true, as PBFT will not al-
low such a double-spend, since PBFT and similar protocols provide
safety even in asynchronous networks. However, asynchrony is
still a problem for BFT protocols such as PBFT, as no more progress
(liveness) can be made. PBFT and other protocols handle this is-
sue by adopting a semi-synchronous model which is increasing the
time limits whenever messages do not arrive in time. This may dra-
matically slow down the protocol, as a byzantine agent can simply
wait with sending messages before timers run out.
ABC on the other hand does not have to deal with timing as-
sumptions:Whenever amessage arrives, the systemmakes progress
towards establishing or confirming a transaction. Few systems, such
as HoneyBadger BFT or (consensus-less) broadcast-based proto-
cols, share this resiliency to asynchrony with ABC.
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→ (p1, 1),v1
→ (p2, 3),v2
Genesis
(p2, 3) → (p3, 3)
v3
(p3, 3) → (p4, 3)
v4
→ (p4, 3),v4
→ (p1, 1),v1
v2 v3
Checkpoint
v2
(a) Example transaction DAG. Some agent issued a checkpoint and the validator v2 signs the checkpoint as accurate.
→ (p1, 1),v1
→ (p2, 3),v2
Genesis
(p2, 3) → (p3, 3)
v3
(p3, 3) → (p4, 3)
v4
(p1, 1) → (p5, 1)
→ (p4, 3),v4
→ (p1, 1),v1
v2 v3
v4
Checkpoint
v2
v4 :
(p1, 1) → (p5, 1)
(b) The validator v4 repeats its’ ack that was not included in the checkpoint.
→ (p1, 1),v1
→ (p2, 3),v2
Genesis
→ (p4, 3),v4
→ (p1, 1),v1
Checkpoint
v2
v4 :
(p1, 1) → (p5, 1)
(c) Agents joining the system do not need to process the transactions summarized by the checkpoint.
Figure 6: Example illustration of a checkpoint.
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